Friday, June 15, 2007

Roberto J. González: Alberto Gonzales & the Lawyers of the Third Reich

(Courtesy of Thoughts on the Eve of Apocalypse)

Alberto Gonzales & the Lawyers of the Third Reich
By Roberto J. González
Z Magazine

...

Many of the new policies swept away restrictions on the treatment and interrogation of detainees, which shocked a number of prominent people in the U.S. In January 2005 a dozen retired generals and admirals publicly opposed Gonzales’s attorney general nomination, declaring, “U.S. detention and interrogation operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Guantanamo Bay, and elsewhere…have fostered greater animosity toward the U.S., undermined our intelligence gathering efforts, and added to the risks facing our troops serving around the world.”

Days later, members of the Senate Judiciary Committee attending Gonzales’s confirmation hearings were stunned by Admiral John Hutson’s testimony. Hutson, a retired U.S. Navy Judge Advocate General, warned, “The strongest nation on earth can ill afford an attorney general who engages in sloppy, shortsighted legal analysis or who doesn’t object when others do.”

Even more frightening are the words of retired U.S. Army Judge Advocate General Corps, Jordan Paust, who wrote, “Not since the Nazi era have so many lawyers been so clearly involved in international crimes concerning the treatment and interrogation of persons detained during war.” Other legal scholars, including Scott Horton and Sanford Levinson, have made similar observations.


Bush-Cheney’s Legal Team and the Third Reich Jurists

Such comments beg a serious question: To what extent are Bush’s legal counselors (including Gonzales) playing a role analogous to that of Nazi jurists in the 1930s? The answer is disturbing. Though there are obvious differences in political ideologies and historical context, there are key similarities:

1. A “state of emergency” was declared to strengthen executive power. In both cases, government lawyers claimed that extraordinary circumstances required boosting executive power vis-a-vis both Congress (Reichstag in Germany) and the courts. In Germany, a “state of emergency” was triggered by the February 1933 Reichstag fire, which led to President von Hindenberg’s signing of the Reichstag Fire Decree. This allowed the Nazis to suspend civil liberties and detain suspected Communists. A month later the Reich- stag passed the Enabling Act, which gave the chancellor power to enact laws, foreign treaties, and constitutional changes without parliamentary approval.

In the U.S., the 9/11 attacks triggered a “state of emergency.” Congress passed the “Use of Force Resolution” on September 14 (which ceded war power to the president) and the USA PATRIOT Act on October 26 (which restricted civil liberties). A November 13 executive order proclaiming a state of “extraordinary emergency” announced rules for defining enemy combatants and for forming military commissions not subject to congressional or judicial review.

2. Political theories provided a legal framework for executive usurpation of power. In the 1920s, influential German legal scholar Carl Schmitt argued that a strong dictatorship more effectively embodies the people’s will than parliamentary democracies, since dictators can act more quickly and decisively. He theorized that a government capable of decisive action must include a dictatorial element in its constitution, which can be triggered in emergencies. This was the tool he crafted for dismantling liberal democracy. (Schmitt later joined the Nazi party and was appointed director of the Union of Nazi Jurists.) This theory became fully developed in the “Führer principle”—the notion that the Führer’s will is the law—and was realized in 1934, when Hitler merged the offices of president and chancellor.

In the U.S., the unitary executive theory emerged as an important concept among a radical Republican fringe beginning in the 1970s. In a recent article for the New Republic, Jeffrey Rosen documents the development of this theory in recent years, highlighting the post-9/11 transformation of unitary executive theory into practice under the guidance of Gonzales, Addington, Yoo, Bybee, Flanigan, and others.

3. Parliamentary power was reduced following legal reforms. Parliamentary power in both cases was reduced to a shadow of itself as checks and balances eroded. In Nazi Germany, the impact of the Enabling Act was so severe that by 1934, the Reichstag was effectively a rubber stamp for the Führer.

In the U.S., Congress has not effectively challenged the expansion of executive power since 9/11. Even the conservative group American Freedom Agenda (founded by four prominent Republicans) has recently expressed concern that “since 9/11, the executive branch has chronically usurped legislative or judicial power, and has repeatedly claimed that the president is the law.”

4. Officials from the executive exerted pressure on jurists to limit their independence. In Germany Nazi Justice Minister Roland Freisler warned judges in 1934 that, “It is not the role of the judge to alter the existing laws of the nation” because “chaos and anarchy would replace unified leadership” were judges to “decide questions which can be solved only from the superior vantage point of the Führer.”

In the U.S. Alberto Gonzales has directed polite warnings to the Supreme Court—for example last September when he said, “The Constitution…provides the courts with relatively few tools to superintend military and foreign policy decisions, especially during wartime…. [W]hen courts issue decisions that overturn long-standing traditions…they cannot—and should not—be shielded from criticism…. A proper sense of judicial humility requires judges to keep in mind the institutional limitation of the judiciary.” The U.S. attorney firings are a not-so-polite warning to independently minded federal prosecutors.

5. Legal advisors argued that an unconventional enemy rendered international laws obsolete. In the case of the Nazis, the German General Staff claimed that Russian “partisans” driven by radical Communist ideology were engaging in terrorist attacks, and therefore not subject to the protections of the 1929 Geneva Conventions or the 1907 Hague Convention.

In the U.S. Gonzales, Yoo, and others have argued that Al Qaeda and the Taliban (among others) are driven by radical religious ideology and engaged in terrorist attacks and are therefore not subject to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Consequently, both the Nazi jurists and the Bush legal team viewed international laws as obsolete.

6. Transformations in law led to state-organized brutality. In both cases, the consequences of legal opinions, memos, and directives led to state-organized practices of brutal interrogation, torture, and extermination of enemies. Secret prisons were a feature of both Nazi and U.S. systems though there are significant differences in scale. The Nazis organized the mass murder of millions of people. By contrast, 108 “detainees” have been reported killed in U.S. custody since 2001, with 34 of those suspected or confirmed homicides resulting from harsh interrogations. (It is important to note, however, that an estimated 655,000 “excess deaths” of Iraqis have occurred since 2003, the vast majority of which were civilian deaths.)

Points of Difference

There are, of course, important differences. Nazi lawyers adopted a political ideology cast in terms of “race,” “blood,” and more generally, the “people” (volk). The good of the volk—not of individual Germans—was given precedence over other considerations and Nazi jurists viewed the Führer as the embodiment of the people’s will. This has no analog among the members of the Bush- Cheney legal team.

Another difference is that in the case of Germany, the Reichstag never recovered independent power until after the war. In the case of the U.S. elections of 2006, the Democratic party succeeded in winning a majority. Whether or not they will be willing to roll back the gains in power made by the executive branch since 2001 remains to be seen.

So far, the results have been mixed. While the Senate Judiciary Committee has begun investigating the Justice Department’s domestic policies, they are not likely to repeal the Military Commissions Act or reinstate habeas corpus rights for aliens.

Despite these distinctions, the lengthy list of similarities should concern those who cherish a democratic system of checks and balances. It should also give pause to those who value the rule of international law.

It would be fair to note that the Bush-Cheney administration represents one end of a relatively narrow political spectrum in the U.S., which at the supposed liberal end is represented by the Clinton administration and “new Democrats” such as John Kerry. It is worth remembering that extraordinary rendition was developed by the Clinton administration in the mid-1990s following the Oklahoma City bombing (even though that tragedy was orchestrated by Americans). Furthermore, the “regime change” policy towards Iraq was first formalized when Clinton signed into law the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998. It was also William Cohen (Clinton’s defense secretary) who noted that the U.S. would make “unilateral use of military power” to ensure “uninhibited access to key markets, energy, supplies, and strategic resources.”


John Kerry, days before the 2004 presidential elections, told the Boston Globe, “I do not think the United States should join the International Criminal Court…. U.S. officials, including soldiers, should be provided some protection,” presumably from those seeking to apply the Geneva Conventions and the UN Convention against Torture. Never did the “new Democrat” display concern for providing protection to civilians in Iraq and Afghanistan, much less to those illegally detained at Guantanamo.

To Read the Rest of the Essay

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