National Security Archive: National Intelligence Estimates of the Nuclear Proliferation Problem, The First Ten Years, 1957-1967

National Intelligence Estimates of the Nuclear Proliferation Problem: The First Ten Years, 1957-1967
National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 155
by William Burr
National Security Archive

Washington, D.C., June 1, 2005 - Recently declassified intelligence estimates from the 1950s and 1960s show that a minimal capability to produce two nuclear weapons a year would be a relatively inexpensive investment - $911 million in today's dollars - for a country that sought a nuclear weapons capability. Moreover, the U.S. intelligence community concluded that a country that sought a nuclear weapons capability for prestige reasons or to deter the United States would be difficult to stop even if nuclear test bans and a proliferation agreement were in place.

Beginning in the late 1950s, the U.S. intelligence community began preparing National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) on the problem of nuclear proliferation. This briefing book is the first ever publication of the first ten years of NIEs on nuclear proliferation obtained by the National Security Archive through FOIA and mandatory review requests. The failure last week of the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference makes publication of the estimates especially timely. Besides the estimates themselves, it includes documents, obtained through archival research and FOIA requests, which shed light on the context for the production of the NIEs. Newly declassified documents show how NIEs were requested and produced, how they were followed up, the role of embassies in the estimating process, and the contributions of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) to the NIEs. Among the findings in this collection:

- a basic capability to build two nuclear weapons a year was relatively cheap; no more than $180 million in 1963 dollars (about $911.5 million in today’s dollars);

- in the late 1950s, intelligence analysts saw the spread of "nuclear know-how" around the world as creating widespread capabilities for "small scale" national nuclear weapons programs;

- countries sought nuclear weapons for "prestige" and "military effectiveness"; countries like China sought nuclear weapons as a "deterrent to the use of US nuclear weapons in the Far East";

- multilateral nonproliferation agreements and nuclear test bans could restrain national nuclear programs but could not stop a determined government from initiating a nuclear weapons program;

- estimates on Israeli potential found, in 1961, "considerable evidence" that Israel was "developing capabilities"; by 1966, analysts believed that Israel had "imported and stockpiled sufficient unsafeguarded uranium for a few weapons";

- by the mid-1960s, India appeared to be a likely candidate for nuclear status; if India took a nuclear course, analysts saw Pakistan likely to follow suit, with possible help from China;

- during the late 1950s, analysts saw France, China, West Germany, Japan, Sweden, and Israel as among the countries with the greatest potential to develop nuclear weapons, but that many faced domestic and international constraints on independent nuclear weapons programs;

- by the late 1950s and early 1960s, analysts worried that proliferation could "materially increase" the chance of world war and the risk of an "unintentional
or unauthorized detonation." The acquisition of nuclear weapons by "irresponsible" governments was another risk;

- a CIA report from 1975 shows concern about new "threshold states" including Iran, Libya, South Africa, and Taiwan acquiring nuclear capabilities as well as the threat of nuclear terrorism.

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